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In the past few decades there has been a progressive movement towards regionally based 
free trade areas (FTAs) in North America, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Nafta), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) in Africa, Asean Free 
Trade Area (Afta) and South Asia Free Trade Agreement (Safta) in Asia, and Mercado Común 
del Sur (Mercosur) in South America, among others. The possibility that Mercosur may 
eventually lead to a more ambitious integration project suggests the usefulness of analysing the 
viability of a potential Monetary Union for Mercosur. Moreover, there has been a renewed 
interest in the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA), since the creation of the European 
Monetary Union. 
According to the traditional literature by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), three 
criteria must hold to form an OCA. The first criteria relates to the degree of trade integration 
between the members of the currency union. Gains from monetary unification stem from lower 
transaction costs and from the elimination of exchange rate volatility. The more a pair of 
countries trade, the more that pair will benefit from the reduction in the transaction costs. The 
second criteria is the high degree of business cycle synchronisation. Losses come from the 
inability to pursue independent adjustment policies. The extent of losses depends on the size and 
incidence of shocks. If these are symmetrically distributed across countries, symmetrical policy 
responses will be enough, eliminating the need for policy autonomy. Finally, the third criteria 
relates to the degree of labour mobility and wage flexibility in the economies. If I consider the 
case of asymmetric shocks, as the possibility of independent monetary policy is foregone, 
labour mobility and wage flexibility would allow for a faster and less costly adjustment. 
The aforementioned traditional literature on this subject treats these criteria as exogenous. 
However, more recent literature has investigated the issue. Frankel and Rose (1998) reassessed 




endogenous. In particular, they focused on the endogeneity of trade integration and cycle 
synchronisation. Their hypothesis is that more integration can be expected to lead to more trade; 
and more international trade will result in more highly correlated business cycles. 
In that sense, this research aims at testing this hypothesis for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. 
It intends to analyse empirically the impact of reduced trade barriers, and then, increased trade 
on the synchronisation of the business cycles using a panel of bilateral trade and business cycle 
data spanning the three Mercosur countries over sixty-four quarters, with three different time 
spans. My empirical findings indicate that closer international trade links result in more closely 
correlated business cycles across the three countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework going through 
the history of Mercosur, the motives for which the Monetary Union is desirable, the OCA 
criteria and its criticism, a formal analysis of the framework itself, and a literature review. 
Section 3 discusses in detail the empirical methodology and the data collection and elaboration 
process. I next show the obtained results on the impact evaluation of trade integration on 
business cycle synchronisation in section 4. In the same section a comparison with other 
exercises and a personal comment are provided. Section 5 ends the paper reporting the 
conclusions. 
2. Theoretical framework 
The current section introduces the theoretical framework starting from a brief summary of 
the history of Mercosur and explaining the reasons why the Monetary Union is a desirable 
event. Then, an overview on the OCAs criteria and its criticism is provided, as well as the 
formal analysis of the framework itself. The literature review concludes the section. 
2.1. History of Mercosur 
Economic integration among the members of the Mercosur started long before its conception 
in 1991. Originally Argentina and Brazil, by far the largest two Mercosur members (in terms of 
geographic size, population and output) discussed regional integration in the 1960s during the 
Cartagena Consensus. However, the process of integration was interrupted by the economic and 
political turmoil of the 1970s. Links between Paraguay and Uruguay, the smaller members of 
Mercosur, grew steadily over time; they initiated under the Asociación Latinoamericana de 
Integración (ALADI) with the Least Favoured Nation (LFN) clause between Uruguay and 
Paraguay. By the 1970s bilateral trade between Uruguay and its neighbours, Brazil and 




Argentino-Uruguayo de Cooperación Económica (CAUCE) Treaty (between Argentina and 
Uruguay) and the Protocolo de Expansión Comercial (PEC) Treaty (between Brazil and 
Uruguay). Brazil and Argentina traded significantly more with one another during the 1980s, 
mostly attributable to the exchange rate and inflation stabilisation policies that were 
implemented at that time. 
The first official stage of integration, between Argentina and Brazil, was the Argentine-
Brazilian Cooperation and Integration Act signed in July 1986. This removed some sector trade 
barriers between the two countries. It corresponds to the European economic integration of 
1951, which created a free trade zone in specific sectors (namely coal and steel). Due to the 
concern over stability issues in 1987, the two governments signed the Gaucho Protocol (one of 
several signed under the Argentine-Brazilian Cooperation and Integration Act), which initiated 
research into the possibility of currency union between Argentina and Brazil. However, shortly 
after the signing of this Protocol, exchange rate crises in both countries dampened currency 
union integration efforts. In November 1988, the Integration Cooperation and Development 
Treaty was signed by Argentina and Brazil, which expanded the free trade area created by the 
1986 Act. 
By July1990, the Argentine-Brazilian Cooperation and Integration Act had set the date for 
the creation of a free trade area between the two countries for late 1994, but was extended to 
include Paraguay and Uruguay after diplomatic requests. Thus in 1991, the Treaty of Asunción 
was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, which established the objective of a 
common market among these member countries, to be effective on January 1st 1995. The 1991 
Treaty demanded that by June 1991, 40% of the tariffs among the member countries would be 
removed. After this, there would be six monthly reductions in tariffs until they were eliminated 
and a free trade was established. Mercosur aimed to establish the free movement of goods, 
services and factors of production among member countries, the setting of a common external 
tariff, the adoption of a common trade policy regarding the rest of the world, and the ambitious 
coordination of macroeconomic and sector policies. 
In December 1994, the Ouro-Preto summit modified the schedule set out in the Treaty of 
Asunción and created the Ouro-Preto Protocol, laying down the institutional structure of 
Mercosur. At this summit, member countries agreed to implement a customs union before the 
implementation of a common market. This customs union became operational on January 1
st 
1995, with the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among the member countries, and the 
setting of a common external tariff although its application was note complete immediately
2
. To 
ease the transition of Mercosur into a common market, a transitory schedule was established at 




were allowed to remain protected by member tariffs. As stated by Paglieri and Sanguinetti 
(1998), Argentina continued to protect 223 categories, Brazil protected 29 categories, Paraguay 
protected 272 categories, while Uruguay protected 1018 products
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. 
In 1995, Mercosur members agreed to end this transition period by 2001, phasing temporary 
protectionary tariffs out in order to ensure totally free trade between members by 2000. By 
1996, tariffs were reduced by 25%, 50% by 1997, 75% by 1998, and eliminated by 1999 for the 
case of Argentina and Brazil, while Paraguay and Uruguay were required to eliminate tariffs by 
2000. In addition, permission was granted to allow 300 products per member to remain exempt 
from the common external tariff until 2001 for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, and 2006 for 
Paraguay. Hence, the Mercosur customs union became fully operational in 2006
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. The founding 
of the Mercosur Parliament was agreed at the December 2004 presidential summit. It should 
have 18 representatives from each country by 2010. 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru currently have associate member status. 
Venezuela signed a membership agreement on 17th June 2006, but before becoming a full 
member its entry has to be ratified by the Paraguyan and Brazilian parliaments. In May 2007, 
the Brazilian Senate asked Venezuela to reconsider the non-renewal of Radio Caracas 
Televisión Internacional (RCTV) license, an oppositionist television network. President Hugo 
Chávez responded accusing the Brazilian Congress of being subservient to interests of the US. 
The leader of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party in the Senate, Senator Arthur Virgílio, 
stated that the party will try to prevent Venezuela's entry in Mercosur. 
2.2. Motives for the creation of Monetary Union in Mercosur 
Motives for the monetary unification between the members of Mercosur are numerous. 
Recent history has proven that due to policy mismanagement and failed stabilisation policies, no 
full member of Mercosur has the ability to implement credible, effective monetary policy. In 
1991, Argentina implemented a currency board, under the Convertibility Plan
5
 which collapsed 
on 10th January 2002. Uruguay had a target zone until June 2002 (when it allowed the Peso to 
float freely) which operated like a crawling peg, since the exchange rate was nearly always on 
the bottom of the set band. Brazil also had a target zone based on Real Plan
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 which collapsed on 
January 14th 1999, after which point, the Brazilian Central Bank allowed the currency to float. 
The ultimate aim of monetary union would therefore be to create a credible and effective 
monetary policy in order to help provide economic stability for the region. Inflation stabilisation 
policies have been implemented in Mercosur to reduce the high and in some cases hyper-
inflation experienced by their economies
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credible monetary policy is therefore of primary importance. Inflation rates experienced by the 
full members of Mercosur (except Paraguay) have been highly volatile in the period 1975-1998, 
during which Argentina and Brazil experienced ranges of between near 0% to 3057%, and 3.5% 
to 2059%, respectively. The inability to manage prices generated high volatility of the 
Argentine and Brazilian exchange rates with disruptive consequences. This is why the need for 
credible and effective monetary policy is one of the primary motives of monetary union. 
Today the inflation is still one of the most scaring problems not only for Mercosur members, 
but for all Latin America. The upward pressures are mostly due to the saturation of the 
productive capacity and to the international context of rising prices of the commodities. Figure 
2.1 shows the evolution of the average quarterly inflation rate for the region from June 2003 to 
June 2008. 
Figure 2.2 presents the average inflation rate projections for 11 Latin American countries for 
2008 and 2009. It is observable that the Mercosur countries with a faint exception of Brazil are 
going to manage one of the highest rates of the region. 
If a regional bank is committed to controlling inflation, and has a credible reputation, it could 
respond effectively to external shocks. Even if these shocks are asymmetric to the regional 
members, the one size fits all monetary policy could still be more effective than national 
monetary policies that would have been implemented if monetary union had not been pursued. 
This may lead to a more stable economic environment, promoting investment, stable capital 
flows, and economic growth. If this concept were to be taken further, it is even possible that in 
the long run a stable currency, widely used by the fourth of fifth largest trading bloc in the 
world, could become a possible currency to be included in the portfolio of reserves in foreign 
central banks, which in turn could cause an appreciation of its value. 
In a certain sense the so-called cost of relinquishing national monetary policy to a regional 
body is also low in the case of Mercosur, since there is little credible monetary policy for the 
full members of Mercosur to relinquish. A new regional central bank could abandon the old 
legacies of political corruption and monetary mismanagement that plagued the central banks and 
governments of past political and military movements that governed these countries. 
Due to the poor macroeconomic management of member economies, credit rating of their 
international debt has lowered, and therefore the cost of such debt is still quite high. Monetary 
union, with a credible regional central bank, could reduce the cost of debt in international 
markets, reducing the huge spreads with US Treasury bills, by improving government credit 
ranking. Better credit ratings would also reduce the cost of creating debt by the regional body, 
making it cheaper for the member governments to finance possible infrastructure projects in an 




potential savings in debt payments are those economies who direct public debt towards 
international markets, namely Argentina and Brazil. 
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) propose that the focus of credit ratings on inflation and 
excessive public spending may dissipate if monetary union occurs with the coordination of 
fiscal policy between member countries, as was the case in Europe under the Maastricht Treaty. 
Member countries’ central banks would be unable to benefit from a lack of fiscal discipline, 
because fiscal policy would be common to all the members. 
Monetary union may also free up reserves that could be used to create investment 
opportunities. If a single regional central bank were to hold reserves, the level of reserves held 
by this bank could be less than the sum of each member’s central bank reserves, since the 
national central banks may “over stock” due to the possibility of speculative attacks, while the 
regional bank could keep the optimum level of reserves. Monetary union could therefore lower 
the cost to the regional central bank of holding international reserves. 
Another motive for monetary union is to gain a stronger bargaining position internationally. 
The formation of Mercosur has allowed the member countries to negotiate in international 
forums as a regional bloc. If the members were to form a monetary union and create regional 
institutions, similar to the European Commission
8
, they would increase their presence in the 
international arena, possibly resulting in better trading arrangements with the US, EU, and the 
rest of the world. 
To summarise, there are a number of motives for Mercosur to form a monetary union. 
Firstly, the monetary policy of each country in Mercosur is relatively ineffective because the 
policies have little credibility. Instead of losing sovereignty over monetary policy, a regional 
central bank may actually create credible monetary policy that could react to external shocks 
effectively. Secondly, due to the poor macroeconomic management of member economies, their 
credit ratings for international debt are poor, and therefore the cost of such debt is very high. 
Thirdly, monetary union provides the possibility of a reduction in the cost of central bank 
reserves and may create a currency that could even be used by other foreign central banks as a 
reserve currency. Finally, bargaining as a regional bloc could be an advantage in international 
negotiations. 
2.3. The theory of OCAs and its criticism 
In 1961 Mundell published a pioneering paper, in which he first developed the concept of 
OCA. Important contributions have been brought about by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen 




written about OCAs, there are some relevant surveys by Tavlas (1993), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1996b). 
 The so called traditional literature focuses on three crucial relationships mentioned in the 
introduction. These are the extent of trade, the similarity of shocks and cycles, and labour 
mobility and wage flexibility. The more intense any of the three relations among the countries, 
the more appropriate a common currency. Some authors added a fourth criteria: the analysis of 
the risk sharing system, mainly through fiscal transfers.  
The extent of trade was originally suggested by McKinnon as an important factor and is one 
of the main determinants of whether or not to pursue a monetary union. In the case of two 
countries, the higher the level of bilateral trade, the more “valuable” exchange rate stability is 
between these economies. Exchange rate variability is thought to disrupt trade flows and market 
integration by complicating price comparisons, and creating the requirement of importers and 
exporters to hedge, adding to their costs and reducing the volume of intra-regional trade. This 
was the primary motive given by the European Commission when pressed on the requirement of 
the Single European Market to form a single currency. Empirical studies by Frankel and Wei 
(1995) have supported this argument, finding that there appears to be a relatively small but 
statistically significant negative impact of exchange rate variability on trade. 
The degree of symmetry between real business cycles of economies choosing to form a 
monetary union is an important part of the OCA theory. The theory states that the cost of 
relinquishing monetary policy is minimised when the exchange rate is least required to change 
relative prices. If underlying shocks to the member economies are symmetric, it is likely that the 
real business cycles between them will also be symmetric, and therefore monetary policy to 
react to such shocks should be symmetric. However, Kenen (1995) argues that past business 
cycle asymmetries are of no significance to the analysis of monetary union, since it is only 
present and future shocks and their behaviour that are relevant. Without being able to predict 
future business cycles accurately, Kenen’s argument is of little use in empirically analysing the 
feasibility of monetary union, but should be kept in mind when drawing final conclusions. 
The theory of OCAs also suggests that factors within the area must be mobile in order for the 
area to sustain a monetary union. Labour markets must be integrated so that they can react to 
shocks affecting members within the region. Assume a region is in equilibrium and a sub-region 
is hit by an adverse productivity or terms of trade shock. This sub-region will experience a fall 
in output and real wage, while the rest of the region remains in equilibrium. Theory states that 
workers from the adversely affected sub-region would migrate to the unaffected region, in order 
to enjoy higher wages and employment opportunities. This would cause the real wage to rise in 




the decrease and increase in supply of labour respectively. This process would continue until 
real wage parity is achieved between the two regions, maximising efficiency since all workers 
are employed in the area in which they are most productive, allowing the adverse shock to one 
sub-region to be spread amongst the rest of the region. 
Therefore the benefits of an economy pursuing its own independent monetary policy, under a 
floating exchange rate regime, are reduced when it is highly integrated with its neighbours. This 
is because when the whole region is in recession, the regional central bank could implement a 
monetary expansion, eliminating the need for monetary independence between the smaller 
regions. 
For an area to be an OCA, it must also have real wage and price flexibility in order for sub-
regions within it to react to adverse shocks efficiently. If factor mobility was limited between 
the members of such a monetary union, an adverse shock to one sub-region would require 
independent sovereign monetary policy to prevent under-capacity utilisation and/or higher 
unemployment. Independent monetary policy could devalue the nominal exchange rate so as to 
reduce the sub-region’s price level, however it must be noted that this would be ineffective if 
prices and/or wages are inflexible. 
The coordination of fiscal policy in a monetary union also reduces the need for independent 
monetary policy. This is because the creation of a federal fiscal system would allow the transfer 
of funds from the regions not affected by an adverse shock to those sub-regions suffering from 
such a shock. European Monetary Union (EMU) recognised the need for coordination of fiscal 
policy, and made provision for it in the Maastricht Treaty.  
The OCA framework has been extensively adopted by researchers, but Frankel and Rose 
(1998) put it under criticism, considering this procedure invalid, because they suspect joint 
endogeneity between the first two criteria. Therefore they state that the degree of integration 
among potential members of a common currency area cannot be considered independently of 
income correlation, because one depends on the other. They hypothesised that more integration 
can be expected to lead to more trade, and more international trade will result in more highly 
correlated business cycles. 
2.4. More formally 
From the formal point of view, Frankel and Rose (1998) suggest to express output as: 
        ( 1 )  
where   is the growth rate of real output for the domestic country at time  ;   is the 




average growth rate at time ,  ;  is the weight of sector   in total output  ; and   
is the trend rate of output growth for the country. The analogue for the foreign country is: 
        ( 2 )  
where an asterisk denotes a foreign value, and assumes that the sector-specific shocks (but 
not the sector-specific output shares) are common across countries. 
It is assumed that   are distributed independently across both sector and time of each 
other, with sector-specific variance  . Moreover it is assumed that   are distributed 
independently over time and independently of the sector-specific shocks. 
The cross-country covariance is: 
 
            (3) 
where   is the covariance between the country-specific aggregate shocks. 
The degree to which business cycles are correlated internationally rises or falls depending on 
how this covariance changes with increased integration. Increased trade results in greater 
specialisation if most trade is inter-industry. As countries tend to produce and export goods in 
which they have a comparative advantage, a negative cross-industry correlation between  i α  and 
*
i α  tends to develop; the covariance falls accordingly. If much trade is within rather than 
between industries, intra-industry, these specialisation effects may be small. The covariance 
may also be affected by the spill-over of aggregate demand shocks, or by the productivity 
shocks induced by trade integration, as explained by Coe and Helpman (1995). 
Therefore, stronger international integration tends to raise the covariance of country-specific 
demand shocks and aggregate productivity shocks, thus increasing the international coherence 
of business cycles. On the other hand, integration may tend to raise the degree of industrial 
specialisation, leading to more asynchronous business cycles. Since the effect of trade 
integration on business cycles is theoretically ambiguous, it can only be explained empirically. 
2.5. Literature review 
According to the view of the European Commission
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, differential shocks in demand will 
occur less frequently in a monetary union. The reason is that trade between the industrial 
European nations is to a large degree intra-industry trade. The trade is based on the existence of 




trade in which countries buy and sell the same categories of products to each other. Thus, such 
countries’ aggregate demand will be affected in similar ways. 
The other and opposite view has been defended by Paul Krugman (1991). According to him, 
one cannot discard Mundell’s analysis, because there is another feature of the dynamics of trade 
with economies of scale that may make it still relevant. Trade integration that occurs as a result 
of economies of scale also leads to regional concentration of industrial activities
10
. The idea is 
that when barriers to trade decline, this has two opposing effects on the localisation of 
industries. It makes it possible to produce closer to the final markets, but it also makes it 
possible to concentrate production so as to profit from economies of scale. This explains why 
trade integration may in fact lead to more concentration of regional activities rather than less. 
This way sector-specific shocks may then become country specific shocks, because countries 
turn out to be more specialised so that they will be subjected to more rather than fewer 
asymmetric shocks. Countries faced with these shocks may then prefer to use the exchange rate 
as an instrument of economic policy to correct for these disturbances. 
I could look at the issue also in these terms: if it is aggregate demand shocks that are 
dominant in driving business cycles, it is expected that an increase in trade integration will 
increase synchronicity. Instead, if it is either supply or demand industry-specific shocks that are 
the dominant force behind business cycles, then the relation between trade integration and 
synchronicity would depend on the pattern of trade that characterises the economies. The 
relation would be negative if trade is mainly inter-industry. If instead, trade is mainly intra-
industry, supply or demand industry-specific shocks will not necessarily lead to asymmetric 
effects. The two views are represented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
De Grauwe (2005) states that both effects exist, but the concentration and agglomeration 
effect will be blind of the existence of national borders. This creates the possibility that the 
clusters of economic activity will encompass borders. Then, it would be correct to say that 
regions where the activity is concentrated may still be very much affected by asymmetric 
shocks. 
At this point the issue remains an empirical one. Canova and Dellas (1993) studied the 
relationship between bilateral trade linkages and cyclical fluctuations using a set of time-series 
techniques on data for ten large industrial countries from 1960 through 1986. However the focus 
of their investigation is on the transmission of shocks across countries that are linked by trade, 
rather than on the effects of changing trade integration on business cycle coherency. They find 
that the relationship is generally positive, but dependent on the de-trending method. 
Rose (2000), Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) and Rose (2004) applied panel data analysis 




trade flows between the members of the union. They found that on average the mere fact of 
belonging to the same monetary union doubles the size of trade flows. Studies by  Persson 
(2001) and Nitsch (2001) have criticised Rose’s results on econometric grounds. Other analysis, 
such as the ones by Bun and Klaasen (2002), Micco et al.( 2003), and De Nardis and Viccarelli 
(2003) have focused on trade effects of the monetary integration in Europe. The concluding 
remark of these studies is that the trade effect of monetary union in Europe is likely to be much 
smaller from the one calculated by Rose, but remains a sizeable effect. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) tried to understand if increased integration affects the asymmetry of 
shocks. Their conclusion was that a closer trade linkage between two countries is strongly and 
consistently associated with more tightly correlated economic activity between the two 
countries. This is also confirmed in the studies of Rose and Engel (2001) and Rose (2002). 
Similar evidence is presented by Artis and Shang (1995), who find that as the European 
countries have become more integrated during the 1980s and 1990s, the business cycles of these 
countries have become more correlated. 
3. Empirical methodology 
This section presents the empirical methodology by which the investigation aims to answer 
the following question: what is the impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronicity 
for Mercosur countries from 1991 to 2006? 
3.1. The model 
In order to deal with the first question I proceed by means of the Frankel and Rose (1998) 
guidelines. The regressions to be estimated are: 
      ( 4 )  
      ( 5 )  
where   is the cyclical component of output   for country   and   is the time span. Higher 
correlations imply a higher degree of synchronisation. I compute the correlations for each pair   
and   of Mercosur countries output as: 




I calculated the average values of the trade ratios normalised by international trade and by 
nominal Growth Domestic Product (GDP) over the mentioned time spans. Thus,  and 
 are measures of trade intensity computed as follow: 
     (7) 
       ( 8 )  
where   denotes total nominal exports from country   to country   during period  ;   
denotes total global exports from country  ;   denotes imports; and   is the level of nominal 
GDP in country   at period  . The first measure normalises total bilateral trade by international 
trade data, whereas the second one by nominal GDP in the two countries. I use both   or 
 as independent variables.   represents the numerous influences on bilateral activity 
correlations above and beyond the influences of international trade. 
My interest falls on the sign and the size of the slope coefficient  . The sign explains if the 
specialisation effect prevails, in which case I would obtain a negative  , or if the hypothesised 
effect dominates, in which case the sign on   would be positive. The size of the coefficient 
allows us to quantify the relevance of the effects. 
I start estimating the regression by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The estimated model, 
however, is in some cases characterised by heteroscedasticity. For the latters the variance-
covariance matrix is thus adjusted using the Huber procedure to account for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form. 
The first regression I estimate is the one that presents trade ratios normalised by international 
trade as independent variable, and correlations computed on data de-trended by differencing as 
dependent variable. For the second one, I estimate the equation that depicts trade ratios 
normalised by nominal output as independent variable and again correlations obtained through 
differencing as dependent variable. Thirdly, I substitute the dependent variable with the 
correlations derived from data de-trended by Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, keeping trade ratios 
normalised by international trade as independent variable. Finally, I maintain the correlations 
derived from data de-trended by HP filter as dependent variable, using trade ratios normalised 
by nominal output as independent variable.  
The OLS estimation could yield inconsistent estimates for  . The trade intensity variable 
may result to be endogenous. Usually countries are likely to peg their currencies intentionally to 
those of their most important trading partners, in order to capture gains associated with greater 




Finally, the association could be the result of countries application of the OCA criterion, rather 
than an aspect of economic structure that is invariant to exchange rate regimes. 
It follows that I need to instrument the trade intensity term with exogenous instrumental 
variables (IV). These are also applied for error in measurement of the regressor. Frankel and 
Rose (1998) suggest to use three IV that are devised from the gravity model of bilateral trade: 
the natural logarithm of the distance between the capitals of the relevant pair of countries, a 
dummy variable that indicates if the pair of countries share a common language, and a dummy 
variable that shows if the countries are adjacent. Since the common language variable is not so 
appropriate to the context, and the adjacency variable is irrelevant for the considered Mercosur 
countries, other variables could replace them. The literature sometimes uses the natural 
logarithm of the product of the countries’ population to have an exogenous variable measuring 
the mass effect on bilateral trade intensities, thus I put it in the equation. Then, I added the 
natural logarithm of the product of real GDP of the country pairs, the natural logarithm of the 
product of the countries’ dimension, and the natural logarithm of real exchange rate between the 
pair of countries. 
I run a first stage regression of the natural logarithm of bilateral period-average trade 





It is worthwhile noting that the average values were calculated over the time span for the 
following IV: ,  , and  .  
Finally, the equations are estimated using the within estimator for the group fixed effects, 
and using the random effects estimator. 
3.2. Data 
The chosen period goes from the first quarter of 1991 to the last quarter of 2006 for both the 
research questions. The starting year is corresponding to the sign of the Asuncion Treaty, the 




The analysis focuses on the Mercosur members: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Given the 
poor availability of data on Paraguay and its modest impact in percentage terms of GDP on the 
Mercosur aggregate, it has been neglected. 
In order to answer the question I downloaded quarterly bilateral trade data from International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)-Direction of Trade Statistics (DTS), and total imports and total exports 
from International Finance Statistics (IFS) for the above mentioned countries. I used Cost 
Insurance and Freight (CIF) imports data and Free On Board (FOB) exports data for all the 
calculations of the two trade intensity measures (independent variables in the regressions to be 
estimated). 
Frankel and Rose (1998) assert that the measure of the country output (which correlations 
represent the dependent variable in the regression to be estimated) could be one of the 
following: natural logarithm of real GDP, natural logarithm of industrial production, natural 
logarithm of employment or unemployment rate. Given the data availability for Mercosur 
countries I have decided to use the natural logarithm of GDP at 2000 constant prices. 
I obtained the yearly current and constant 1993 prices GDP data in Pesos for Argentina from 
IMF-IFS database. I filled two missing observations taking data from Ministerio de Economía y 
Producción - República Argentina (MECON). The current and constant 2000 prices yearly data 
in US Dollars have been downloaded from World Bank (WB)-World Development Indicators 
(WDI). I got quarterly current GDP data in Pesos and quarterly real exchange rate from IFS. 
Thus, I firstly calculated the quarterly current GDP data in US Dollars. Then, I calculated the 
yearly GDP deflator for Pesos and US Dollars as follows: 
   (11) 
where   is the country and   is the currency. Finally, I computed both constant 2000 prices 
GDP quarterly data in US Dollars and Pesos using the yearly GDP deflator. 
    (12) 
Brazilian yearly current prices GDP data in Reales have been downloaded from IFS, as well 
as yearly GDP deflator data for year 2000, through which I calculated GDP constant 2000 
prices in Reales, using the inverse of (11). Current and constant 2000 prices yearly data in US 
Dollars are coming from WDI. I got quarterly current GDP data in Reales and the quarterly real 
exchange rate from IFS. As for Argentina, I calculated both constant 2000 prices GDP quarterly 




Uruguayan yearly current and constant 1983 prices GDP data in Pesos have been 
downloaded from IFS. Hence, I calculated the yearly GDP deflator for the year 1983 by (11), 
and I converted its base in 2000. Current and constant 2000 prices GDP yearly data in US 
Dollars are coming from WDI. As previously, I calculated the yearly GDP deflator by (12). I 
got quarterly constant 1983 prices GDP data in Pesos from Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) website. Once I calculated quarterly current GDP data 
through the inverse of (12), I got quarterly constant 2000 prices GDP data in Pesos applying the 
same formula. In order to compute quarterly current GDP data in US Dollars I downloaded 
quarterly real exchange rate from IFS. Finally I calculated quarterly constant 2000 prices GDP 
data in US Dollars by (12). 
With respect to the IV, instead of taking the distance between the capitals of the three 
Mercosur countries as usually suggested by the gravity equation theory, I took data on distance 
between their business centres. So for the Brazilian case, Brasilia has been substituted with San 
Paulo. Data have been retrieved from the Argentinean Central Bank website. Population and 
country size data have been obtained from the respective countries’ Central Bank website. 
Once I got all the nominal and real GDP, trade, population and country size data, I calculated 
the natural logarithm. 
3.3. Seasonality adjustment and de-trending 




First differencing at fourth lag has been applied to de-trend real GDP, trade ratios, 
population and real exchange rate time series. HP filter has been used as an alternative method 
to obtain real GDP cycle components. This removes a smooth trend   from a time series   by 
solving the minimisation problem 
    (13) 
with respect to  . The residual, or deviation from trend   is commonly 
referred to as the business cycle component. In this sense the HP filter is a highpass filter, 
removing the trend and returning high-frequency components in  . The parameter   penalises 
fluctuations in the second differences of  , and must be specified by the user of the HP filter. 
Common practice has been to use   as smoothing parameter when applying the HP 
filter to quarterly economic data. The first differencing at fourth lag implies the loss of the first 
five observations, so for the panel data and in particular for the time span  =16 I get 43 values 




same using a time span   =28
12
. This time I got 32 observations for the differencing method, 
and 37 for the data de-trended by HP filter. Finally, I used a time span   =40, or 10 years. I 
remained with 19 correlations values for the differencing method, and 24 for the HP filtered 
data. 
With respect to the differencing methodology, I perform an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test in order to test for stationarity of the seasonally adjusted time series. I set the test 
with an augmentation equal to five, as the literature suggests for quarterly data. Then I evaluated 
the augmentation order choice looking at the significance of the highest lag coefficient. If the 
fifth lag corresponds a t-Student (not standard) lower that 1.645, then I redo the test choosing 
the number of lags for which the highest is significant. Thus, I did the same for the first 
difference of the non stationary time series). 
Table 3.1 is resuming the ADF test results. 
4. Empirical findings 
Firstly, this section presents the estimates for the impact of trade integration on business 
cycle correlations. I use a panel data across three cross-sections (the country pairs) and through 
64 quarters (from 1991 to 2006). The results are presented for four different methods of 
estimation OLS, IV, Fixed Effects (FE), and Random Effects (RE), two different de-trending 
alternatives (differencing and HP filter) for the dependent variable, two definitions of trade 
integration (trade ratios normalised by international trade or nominal output), and three time 
spans (16, 28, and 40 quarters). 
Secondly, the results are compared with other exercises, and a personal comment on their 
plausibility is provided. 
4.1. Impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronicity 
The discussion is organised as follows: once the table is presented I start pointing out the 
sign and the magnitude of the coefficients obtained for   =16 without group effects (by OLS 
and IV) and introducing group effect (by FE and RE). Then I do the same for   =28 and   =40. 
An overall comment concludes the subsection. For the IV estimation, the R
2 measure of the first 
stage regression is presented before any comment on the significance of the coefficients. Once I 
introduce the group effect it is worthwhile citing the results of the F test about the fixed effects 
influences, and Wald test for overall significance. Each time span paragraph ends up with a 
notice about the preferability of the FE or the RE model when both estimations prove to be 




Table 4.1 presents the above mentioned estimates. On the rows there are the 
estimated coefficients ordered per techniques that allow or not for group effect, whilst 
on the columns the estimations are shown for dependent variable de-trending technique, 
and subsequently for independent variable normalisation technique. The same scheme is 
repeated for the considered time spans. The figures in bold are the significant 
estimations at 5% significance level, while the ones in italic are generated by 
regressions with missing R
2 measure. Absolute value for t statistics (z for RE) for  =0 
are recorded in parenthesis. For what concerns the OLS and IV estimations I performed 
a Breusch-Pagan, Godfrey, Cook-Weisberg, Pagan and Hall, White and Koenker test for 
heteroskedasticity. With respect to FE estimations a modified Wald statistic for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals has been calculated. Thus, if the null 
hypothesis of constant variance is rejected a “robust” adjustment is implemented and it 
is signalled by *. Finally, with respect to the IV estimations the R
2 measure of the first 
stage regressions is always shown. 
With respect to the first column, only in one case a significant value is produced. 
However, it should not be taken into consideration because it is generated by a 
regression with missing R
2 measure. Thus, I will comment only the last three columns.  
For   =16 the OLS estimates are significant at the conventional 5% significance level. I 
cannot find any evidence of a dominant specialisation effect, on the contrary a positive effect of 
trade on business cycle synchronisation seems to prevail for Mercosur countries. The magnitude 
varies broadly among the significant estimates. Coming to the IV estimation, the set of 
instruments explain respectively 18.9% and 99.9% of the variation of  τ ij wt ln and  τ ij wy ln . The 
significant IV coefficients at 5% significance level come again from the same significant OLS 
regressions. The sign of the coefficient confirms that the dominance of a specialisation effect is 
rejected. The IV coefficient from the regression of output correlations de-trended by HP filter 
on trade ratios normalised by international trade shows a magnitude strongly bigger than the 
other IV estimates and the OLS ones. However this result should not be considered because the 
R
2 measure is not provided. In other words this strong change in the magnitude could be a 
distortion due to the low R
2 measure of the first stage regressions. 
Through the within estimator the only significant coefficients at 5% significance level are 
coming from the regressions of the output correlations de-trended by HP filter on the trade ratio 
normalised by international trade and nominal output. Looking at the F test, the null hypothesis 




mentioned equations. The within R
2 measure, the appropriate one for this model, suggests that 
respectively 11.9% and 24.8% of the variation in the data is explained by the included regressor. 
It is worthwhile noting that the magnitudes are quite different, signifying that the normalisation 
method turns out to be relevant. Adopting the random effects model the significant estimates 
come from the same regressions mentioned for the fixed effects model. The overall significance 
of the relationship can be inferred performing a Wald test, and it is confirmed for the significant 
β . The between R
2 measure is very high in the case of the independent variable normalised by 
international trade, indicating that the variation of the data is mostly between sections. Breusch-
Pagan test for the random variation across the pair of countries reveals that the null hypothesis 
of no random effects is decisively rejected for the interesting application at 5% significance 
level. For the regression in which the independent variable is normalised by international trade, 
Hausman test for fixed and random effects fails because the model fitted on these data fails to 
meet the asymptotic assumptions. At 5% significance level the same test proves that the null 
hypothesis of the random effects is rejected in the case where the trade ratios are normalised by 
nominal output, implying the superiority of fixed effects. 
For   =28 the OLS coefficients are still significant. In all cases I get positive values, 
although with different magnitudes. It should be noted that the highest magnitude is coming 
from the equation with the lower R
2 measure, casting doubts on its reliability. This time the set 
of IV explain respectively 26.3% and 99.9% of the variation of  τ ij wt ln and  τ ij wy ln . The results 
confirm basically what is estimated by other techniques and smaller time span, trade integration 
increases the synchronicity of Mercosur countries business cycles. Once again the estimate from 
the output correlations de-trended by HP filter on trade ratios normalised by international trade 
should not be considered because the R
2 measure is not provided. 
Applying the within estimator, the F test suggests that the null hypothesis of no influence of 
the fixed effects on the dependent variable is rejected in all the relevant estimation. The within 
R
2 measure is quite low, it varies from 4.1% to 24.8%. However, the sign of the significant 
coefficient is positive in two cases out of three. It should be observed that the negative sign is 
present on the coefficient that is showing the lowest significant t-value. Neglecting the negative 
case, the magnitudes are close to the ones obtained through the same technique but with shorter 
time span. Through the random effects model only one significant estimate is generated. It is 
still the one from the regression of correlations of output de-trended through HP filter on trade 
ratios normalised by international trade. Wald test for overall significance rejects the null 
hypothesis for the significant estimation. The R
2 measures show that the model overall explains 
7.9% of the variation of the data. Again a strong between variation is present. The sign and the 




trade integration. As before, the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of no random 
effects in every application. As previously, the Hausman test for fixed and random effects fails 
for the significant estimation because the model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic 
assumptions. 
Finally, for   =40 only the OLS estimates coming from the regressions on the trade ratios 
normalised by nominal output are significant. The results basically confirm the findings I 
obtained with shorter time spans. In this last application the set of IV explain respectively 
43.6% and 99.9% of the variation of  τ ij wt ln and  τ ij wy ln . The IV estimates are all significant 
at the conventional significance value, but I cannot consider the coefficients of the regressions 
on trade ratios normalised by international trade, because any R
2 measure is provided. The 
results of the significant regressions, even if with different magnitude, confirm what I got 
through different techniques and shorter time spans. 
Only the coefficient coming from the regression of correlations of output de-trended by 
nominal output turns out to be significant when applying the fixed effects or random effects 
models. The within R
2 is 8.1% for the former, while the latter shows an overall R
2 equal to 
38.0% and interestingly the between R
2 is only 38.6%. No random effect hypothesis is rejected 
by Breusch-Pagan test for the significant estimation, and Hausman test is privileging the 
random effects model. 
Generally, there is evidence of a positive impact of trade intensity on income correlation for 
the Mercosur experience. Looking at the estimates the positive sign is almost always present, 
using both different time spans and various estimation techniques. A negative sign is seen for 
only one estimation, but its t-value is very close to the conventional threshold. Thus, the 
specialisation effect seems not to prevail and it can be inferred that trade among members is 
prevalently intra-industry. The intensity of such effect is reflected by the magnitude of the 
coefficients. It is observable how the significant coefficients of the third column present strong 
differences in magnitude with respect to the values on the other columns. This seems to be due 
to the normalisation technique. With respect to this point, I brought about the analysis as 
suggested by Frankel and Rose, although in my opinion the normalisation by nominal output is 
to be preferred to the one by international trade on theoretical grounds. What really matters is 
whether partner trade is considerable relative to the output. If we neglect the international trade 
normalisation column, then the coefficients are quite homogeneous. 
There is a trade-off about increasing the length of the time span, because the correlations 
output figures are better defined, but the number of observations for the estimations is reduced. 




magnitude seems to converge to similar values using different estimation techniques. 
Furthermore the R
2 measure is improving. 
Two important caveats of the analysis are now presented. The econometric theory affirms 
that the best panel is the one for which the number of sections tends to infinite. The small 
number of sections of the one used in this study may affects the results. Moreover, as alluded IV 
results for shorter time spans should be considered carefully because of the low explanatory 
power of the instruments. 
4.2. Comparison with other studies 
Several econometric studies focusing on Latin America have showed little or negative 
correlations of shocks. Taking two sub-periods (1975-1989 and 1990-1997) Licandro Ferrando 
(1998) states that the shocks in Mercosur are less symmetric than in Europe. However, the 
author illustrates that the shocks correlation between Argentina and Brazil has increased over 
time, suggesting that the deepening of economic integration between Mercosur may be 
rendering shocks less asymmetric. In the same direction are the results for Mercosur in Carrera 
et al. (1998), that detect an increase in correlation for the productive cycles. It should be 
remarked that none of these studies consider the Argentine crisis in 2001 and its effects. 
Although with different techniques, Silva et al. (2004) state that the underlying asymmetries 
between Argentina and Brazil were exacerbated when Brazil switched to a floating regime in 
1999, increasing the divergence in the patterns of output fluctuations. Moreover, even external 
shocks had adverse effects in terms of synchronisation in the Mercosur area. Morandè and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2000), and Larrain et al. (2003) indicate that the degree of synchronisation of 
output movements is low in Latin America, and that the asymmetric shocks are relative large. 
It is worthwhile mentioning Frankel’s book (1997), in which he estimated one of the OCA 
criteria I deal with in this paper, namely, trade flow patterns within regional blocs all over the 
world. Assuming imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, gravity models of 
bilateral trade between pairs of countries are estimated for several regional blocs. In the case of 
Mercosur, the bloc effect of bilateral trade is not significant during 1965-1975, but it becomes 
higher and statistically significant after 1990. The author asserts that the four Mercosur 
countries trade among themselves seven times as much as similar countries.  
Coming to my analysis, trade integration is increasing for the country pairs Argentina-Brazil 
and Argentina-Uruguay, but it is fluctuating a lot for Brazil-Uruguay. Figure 4.5 shows the 
quarterly evolution of the natural logarithm of trade ratios normalised by nominal output from 




However the country pair Argentina-Brazil is the one that really affects the final results, 
because of its weight. With respect to this, it is meaningful to illustrate the yearly Mercosur 
GDP composition (with the exclusion of Paraguay) in the same period. 
As discussed in 2.5, Frankel and Rose (1998) found a strong positive relationship between 
bilateral trade intensity and the synchronisation of business cycles, using a panel of 30 years and 
20 industrial countries. My exercise follows the same model. Additionally, group effects are 
included in the analysis, and three different time spans are considered. For the examined 
Mercosur countries the results confirm what Frankel and Rose assert, although with a much 
smaller size. 
With respect to the coefficient magnitude, it must be said that differently from previous 
works on Mercosur, the period considered for my analysis covers the 2001 Argentine crisis. 
When the Brazilian economy recovered strongly in 2000, Argentina and Uruguay remained in 
recession. Since the objective of the analysis is to understand to which extent trade integration 
affects business cycle synchronicity, what occurred in Argentina plays an important role in 
determining its degree. In other words, the crisis can be considered a fact that has exogenously 
affected the results in a distorting way. It has been thought to control for the event adding a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when the Argentine real GDP observations overcome 
one standard deviation and zero otherwise. However, the structure of the estimated equation 
does not allow for this adjustment because the correlation values are calculated on a specific 
time span that encompasses other observations, beside the distorted ones. This means that if I 
applied the aforementioned correction, I would rule out a lot of observations, many of them not 
altered by the crisis. Then, the size of the obtained estimates could be biased downward, and 
such bias would be stronger the smaller the time span. Intuitively, taking bigger time spans the 
distorting effect should be smoothed. Overall I consider my outcome plausible. 
More generally, I think that the challenge is to think about the endogeneity of OCA in a 
broader sense. Endogeneity is in fact associated with a large amount of progress under many 
OCA properties that are indispensable to sustain monetary unification. Such progress does not 
always seem to follow a linear pattern, and is often the “crowning” of previous stages. Hence, 
the endogeneity of OCA debate should not be confined to just trade integration and income 
correlation. For example, several authors including Artis and Zhang (1997), Artis and Zhang 
(1998), and Buti and Suardi (2000) argue that the European process of economic and monetary 
integration has had significant “disciplining effect” on participating countries which has gone 
together with an increasing business cycles synchronisation. The same has happened for 
inflation in countries with a poor track record in maintaining low inflation after “anchoring” 




endogeneity of political integration, and from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) that discuss the 
endogeneity of labour market institutions. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, an empirical analysis was conducted on the relationship between two 
Mundellian criteria for the determination of an OCA for the Mercosur countries. The 
investigation is an extension of the analysis carried out by Frankel and Rose (1998) on industrial 
countries.  
From the theoretical point of view there could be endogeneity between trade integration and 
business cycle synchronisation, so that the effect of the first variable on the second are unclear. 
On one side the reduction of the trade barriers may bring about more correlated business cycles 
because of common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. On the other side trade integration 
could generate an increased industrial specialisation by country because of inter-industry trade, 
with the associated risk of industry specific shock, and thus more asynchronised output 
fluctuations. 
Using a panel of 64 quarters, three different span lengths, and four different estimation 
techniques for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, I found a positive relationship between the two 
variables, that is higher commercial integration leads to more synchronised cycles. In all but 
one, the significant estimates present the positive sign. Generally, the coefficients vary in 
magnitude; the longer the time span, the higher the significance of the estimates, and the 
magnitude seems to converge to similar values using different estimation techniques. Assessing 
the viability of a Monetary Union in Mercosur goes beyond the purposes of this paper, but 
fundamentally this can be considered a positive evidence for the current debate about its 
applicability. Obviously it is not comprehensive, as I am neglecting other criteria of the classical 
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Argentine constant 2000 prices GDP in US 
Dollars 
Nonstationary Non  stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Dollars Argentine constant 2000 prices GDP 
in Pesos 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary 
Brazilian constant 2000 prices GDP in US 
Dollars 
Non stationary  Stationary  -  - 
Brazilian constant 2000 prices GDP in Reales  Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Uruguayan constant 2000 prices GDP in US 
Dollars 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Uruguayan constant 2000 prices GDP in 
Pesos 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by 
international trade between Argentina and 
Brazil 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by 
international trade between Argentina and 
Uruguay 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by 
international trade between Brazil and 
Uruguay 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by nominal 
output between Argentina and Brazil 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by nominal 
output between Argentina and Uruguay 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Bilateral trade ratios normalised by nominal 
output between Brazil and Uruguay 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Logarithm of the product of the Argentine 
and Brazilian population 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Logarithm of the product of the Argentine 
and Brazilian population 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary 
Logarithm of the product of the Argentine 
and Brazilian population 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary 
Real Exchange rate between Argentina and 
Brazil 
Stationary Stationary -  - 
Real Exchange rate between Argentina and 
Uruguay 
Non stationary  Non stationary  Stationary  Stationary 
Real Exchange rate between Brazil and 
Uruguay 
Stationary Stationary -  - 






Table 4.1 Estimates of β for the impact of trade integration on business cycle correlations 
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Figure 4.1 Trade Integration for country pairs 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Mercosur GDP composition at constant prices (2000) 
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2
 On Janutary 1
st 1995 Mercosur enacted a common external tariff for almost 85% of tariff items of the four 
countries. 
3
 57% of Argentina’s protected products were steel related, 19% textile related, 11% paper sector, and 6% shoe 
sector, while Brazil protected industries ranging from wood and wine to petroleum, Paraguay primarily 
protected textiles, agricultural products, wood and steel, while Uruguay protected textiles, chemical and 
pharmaceutical products, electrical machinery, and metallurgic products. 
4
 Due to the differences in national policies, the sugar and automobile sectors of each member country were 
excluded from the restrictions imposed by the free trade area. 
5
 The Convertibility Plan, besides fixing the Peso to the US Dollar one for one, counted that the monetary 
authority covered the entire monetary base by international reserves and to convert in whatever moment 
Pesos in Dollars at the fixed exchange rate. 
6
 The Real Plan intended to stabilise the domestic currency in nominal terms after a string of failed plans to 
control inflation. It created the Real Unit of Value, which served as key step to the implementation of the 
current currency, the Real. 
7
 These plans included the 1970 Plan and the Tablita Plan in Uruguay, implemented in 1967 and 1990 
respectively, the Tablita, Austral, Spring and Bonex plans in Argentina, and the Cruzad, Bresser, Summer, 
and the Collor I and II Plans for Brazil. 
8
 European Commission has power to impose sanctions internationally for breaches of its legislation, such as in 
the area of competition. 
9
 See EC Commission (1990), and Gros and Thsegen (1992). 
10
 This concept was firstly developed by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1966). 
11
 It estimates the unobserved components in time series following the Autoregressive Integrated Moving 
Average (ARIMA) model-based method. The trend, seasonal, irregular and transitory components are 
estimated and forecasted with signal extraction techniques applied to ARIMA models. 
12
 Such a time span, corresponding to 7 years, is considered the conventional length of a business cycle 